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Extraterritoriality and its Limits: The Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
By CHARLES TAIT GRAVES
"Simply put, a foreign corporation or person will have to choose
between the United States or Iran. " Senator Alfonse D'Amato, March
27, 1995.'
Introduction
In August 1996, President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act, promising to apply trade sanctions against foreign corporations with
significant investments in certain Libyan and Iranian industries.2 Aimed at
deterring those nations' abilities to develop biological or nuclear weapons
and assist terrorist groups, the statute complements the existing restrictions
on American investments in their economies. Although the statute has re-
ceived relatively little attention, coming as it did in the wake of the more
controversial Helms-Burton legislation, it contains a dramatic departure
from traditional trade controls. The Act's sanctions strategy against for-
eign corporations provides for the most radical extension of extraterritorial
jurisdiction yet attempted by Congress.
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act has not yet been enforced, and it
might never be; perhaps Congress intended it only to signal opposition to
European trade with pariah states. Nonetheless, the statute raises serious
questions of the extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the interpretation
of national security clauses of international trade agreements.
This Note examines the validity of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (the Act) both under principles of customary international law and
under existing obligations arising from the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. In doing so, it examines the legal history of U.S. attempts to
legislate extraterritorially to enforce foreign policy goals, with particular
* Member, Class of 1998. B.S., with Honors, University of California at Berkeley,
1994. I would like to thank Professor William S. Dodge for his suggestions for the
structure of this Note.
1. S. RP. No. 104-187, at 5 (1995).
2. John M. Broder & Mary W. Walsh, Clinton Signs Bill Aimed at Foreign Firms in
Libya, Iran, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11256064.
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emphasis on the Freuhauf case from the mid-1960s, the Soviet pipeline
case from the early 1980s, and the immediate predecessor of the Act, the
1996 Helms-Burton legislation.
Like the Helms-Burton statute, the Act threatens secondary boycotts
against foreign corporations that enter certain contracts with Iran or Libya.
While a primary boycott is aimed at an offending entity or state, a secon-
dary boycott is directed against third parties. European and other states
permit their corporations to deal with Iran and, to a lesser extent, Libya,
and the Act seeks to curtail such trade.
Whether the Act is acceptable under international law relates to the
scope of these extraterritorial provisions. Extraterritorial legislation is that
which seeks to bind persons beyond a state's borders to its laws. Although
extraterritoriality is recognized in some limited contexts, its use to enforce
foreign policy has always been highly controversial. The IRan and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 seeks to punish wholly foreign firms for acts legal
in their own countries without any claimed effect on American-owned
property. In that respect, it calls for a further extension of extraterritorial
legislation than the United States has ever attempted.
Under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (the Re-
statement), a state must have "jurisdiction to prescribe" in order to subject
those beyond its borders to its laws.3 Such jurisdiction may exist where
extraterritorial acts have a "substantial" effect within the nation at issue;4 it
must also, however, be "reasonable." 5 In the alternative, a state may exer-
cise extraterritorial jurisdiction to "punish" acts of terrorism.6 This Note
argues that the Act meets none of these conditions because its principal ef-
fects are on third party states rather than sponsors of terrorism and because
the only substantial effect of European trade with Iran and Libya on the
United States is the loss of business by American firms sidelined by cur-
rent trade policy.
Similarly, existing American trade obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade place a realistic limit on the application of
sanctions against foreign firms. Significant import barriers may not be im-
posed under the Most Favored Nation status conferred upon most trading
partners of the United States.7 Moreover, although Article XXI of the
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIC'i RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987) [hereinafter
"THE RESTATEMENT"].
4. Id.
5. Id. at § 403.
6. Id. at § 404.
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (GATT), Art. I. The GATT was renegotiated and included as An-
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treaty provides exceptions for national security, the sanctions envisioned
by the Act do not fall under the previously established definition of that
concept. Thus, standing GATT obligations greatly reduce the likelihood
that the U.S. government could successfully impose the Act.
Finally, political considerations also weigh against application of the
Act to foreign corporations. This is true because the United States may
only damage its trade relations with European allies; because such appli-
cation might result not in the image of a West unified against the govern-
ments of Iran and Libya, but at best a fragile coalition with no agreed upon
approach to terrorist proxies; and because preventing states of the former
Soviet Union from investing in nearby Iran may push them into further
economic and political dependence on Russia or destabilize nations just
now experimenting with market economies. It may well be best if Presi-
dent Clinton suspends operation of the Act without applying sanctions, as
he did in January 1997 with key extraterritorial sections of the Helms-
Burton legislation.9
I. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
A. Background
As it stands today, federal law prohibits American businesses from
engaging in any exports or imports to or from Libya0 and Libyan-
controlled entities.11 In 1995, President Clinton significantly strengthened
existing trade restrictions against imports from Iran12 and banned exports
to and investments in Iran by U.S. businesses. 13 The underlying premise of
nex IA to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
8. GAIT, art. XXI. Such exceptions involve nuclear materials, armaments, and
wartime measures.
9. Steven Lee Myers, One Key Element in Anti-Cuba Lmv Postponed Again, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1997, at Al.
10. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2349aa-8. The statute was passed under the Reagan administra-
tion's efforts against Libya in 1986.
11. Dept. of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, Libyan Sanctions Regu-
lations; Specially Designated Nationals List, 60 Fed. Reg. 8300 (1995); Dept. of the
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Libyan Sanctions Regulations; Specially
Designated Nationals List, 60 Fed. Reg. 37904 (1995); Dept. of the Treasury, Office of
Foreign Assets Control, List of Blocked Persons and Specially Designated Nationals, 59
Fed. Reg. 59460 (1995).
12. President Reagan imposed import restrictions on Iran in 1987. See 52 Fed. Reg.
41940 (1987).
13. Exec. Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24757 (1995) (Prohibiting Certain Trans-
actions with Respect to Iran); Exec. Order No. 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14615 (1995) (Pro-
1998]
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the restrictions is that oil revenues allow Iran and Libya to sponsor groups
seeking to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process and to develop nuclear
weapons.'
4
The President acted in direct response to a plan by the American oil
firm Conoco to oversee the development of two oil fields in Iran. 15
Conoco contracted with the Iranian government in early 1995 to develop
the sites around Sirri Island in the Persian Gulf.16 Two months later,
President Clinton issued an executive order prohibiting foreign subsidiar-
ies of American oil companies from buying Iranian oil exports, 17 which
had accounted for a quarter of Iranian sales.'8 As a result of these restric-
tions, U.S. fins have watched as European and other corporations take
over major development contracts with those states. For example, Total
SA, a French firm, took over the lucrative Conoco project.' 9 Similarly,
many foreign oil companies are attempting to purchase the remaining own-
ership interests of American oil companies in Libya.20
Senator D'Amato introduced the bill in the Senate on March 27, 1995,
stating that the law would force an economic choice between the United
States and Iran or Libya.21 In considering the bill, the Senate heard testi-
mony that Iran's economy was facing a dire shortage of hard currency, and
that it was purchasing four nuclear reactors from Russia.22 The idea that
foreign firms were benefiting at American expense may also have been a
factor in the bill's passage, as the Senate Report on the Act states baldly,
"Total S.A., a French company, wants to help Iran develop its oil re-
sources. [The Act] would make it vastly more difficult for Total S.A. or
other companies to do so."
23
Although the bill passed without opposition, two congressmen ex-
pressed concern about the Act's possible ramifications. In a House Com-
mittee Report, they warned that the bill might prove "counterproductive"
in that it would anger American trading partners and lead to counter-
hibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Re-
sources).
14. H. REP. No. 104-523, Part 1, at 9-10 (1995).
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id.
17. Exec. Order No. 12959, supra note 13.
18. H. REP. No. 104-523, Part I, at 10.
19. Eric Pianin, Clinton Approves Sanctions for investors in Iran, Libya, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 6, 1996, at A8, available in 1996 WL 10724877.
20. Id.
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sanctions.24 They feared that disputes with other states cduld actually de-
crease "multilateral cooperation" against Iran.z The congressmen also
noted that trade sanctions could hurt American businesses; they voted,
however, in committee to support the bill's "fundamental objective--
changing Iranian government behavior."
26
B. The Statute
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act describes itself as
[ain Act to impose sanctions on persons making certain investments di-
rectly and significantly contributing to the enhancement of the ability
of Iran or Libya to develop its petroleum resources, and on persons ex-
porting certain items that enhance Libya's weapons or aviation capa-
bilities or enhance Libya's ability to develop its petroleum resources,
and for other purposes.
27
Section 4, the first substantive section of the statute, outlines a re-
quirement that the President initiate a "multilateral regime" with American
trading allies and within the United Nations to apply sanctions against Ira-
nian petroleum developments. 28 The President is to provide periodic re-
ports to Congress regarding the status of this effort, and states agreeing to
such a plan are not subject to the sanctions outlined in the later sections of
the statute.
29
Sections 5 and 6 contain the Act's extraterritorial provisions, although
the statutory language is rather opaque. The sanctions are to be imposed
against certain "persons; ' 30 such entities can only be foreign corporations
because of the already-existing restrictions on American investments.
24. H. REP. No. 104-523, Part I, at 20 (Additional views of Lee H. Hamilton and
James P. Moran).
25. Id
26. Id. at 22.
27. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541,
50 U.S.C.A. §1701 (1996) [hereinafter "the Act"]. Although no sanctions were threat-
ened in the first months after the Act's passage, in January 1997 the State Department
published a list of eleven Iranian oil and gas projects "which have been publicly ten-
dered," without naming which foreign firms contributed to their development. See Dep't
of State Pub. Notice No. 2501, Significant Projects Which Have Been Tendered in the
Oil and Gas Sector in Iran, 62 Fed. Reg. 1141 (1997).
28. The Act, § 4(a).
29. Id., § 4(b)-(c).
30. The Act defines "person" as any natural person or commercial enterprise. Id., §
14(14).
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The Act sets forth different categories of sanctionable activities for
investments in Iran and Libya. First, it seeks to "deny Iran the financial
means to sustain its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile weapons
programs," as well as its promotion of "international terrorism. 3 1 Any
foreign corporation or governmental body which knowingly makes a single
or aggregate investment totaling more than forty million dollars within a
twelve month period "that directly and significantly contributed to the en-
hancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources of Iran" may be
subject to sanctions.32
The Act's second objective is to force Libyan compliance with United
Nations resolutions on chemical weapons and to prevent its development
of "weapons of mass destruction." 33 Any foreign corporation or govern-
mental body that provides Libya "any goods services, technology, or other
items prohibited by UN Resolutions 748/ 883 A, which allow it to develop
or maintain its military, petroleum, and aviation industries, including nu-
clear, chemical, and biological weapons becomes subject to "mandatory"
sanctions under the Act.3
5
"Investment" under the Act means three categories of interest in Ira-
nian or Libyan oil industries. First, it includes buying shares in a public or
private Libyan or Iranian development of "petroleum resources." It also
includes entering a contract to take direct or supervisory responsibility for
such development or contracting for "royalties, earnings, or profits" from
such development.37 Contracts for "goods, services, or technology," how-
ever, do not fall under the Act's definition of investment.38
Entities engaging in such investments can be sanctioned in six ways; a
violation of the Act calls for at least two of these to be applied. First, the
Export-Import Bank of the United States may refuse to approve a guaran-
tee, insurance, or credit extension "in connection with the export of any
31. Id.
32. Id., § 5.
33. Id.
34. United Nations Security Council Regulations 748 and 883 imposed sanctions
against Libya for its role in terrorist attacks on French and American airliners. See U.N.
SCOR Res. 748 (1992); U.N. SCOR Res. 883 (1993). See also U.N. SCOR Res. 731
(1992).
35. Id.
36. Department of State Notice, Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanc-
tions Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 66067-01 (1996).
37. Id.
38. Id. This means that one could sell Iran or Libya equipment or training for use in
their oil industries without risk of sanction, as long as that party does riot take a more
direct managerial or financial role in developing those industries.
[Vol. 21:715
Extraterritoriality and its Limits
goods or services" to the business or government body?9 Second, the
United States may refuse to permit exports of goods or technology to that
entity. Third, the government may "prohibit any United States financial
institution" from providing loans or credit of more than ten million dollars
in a twelve month period.40 Fourth, if a "financial institution" violates the
statute, the government may refuse to allow that institution to act as a pri-
mary dealer in U.S. debt instruments, become hn agent of the U.S. gov-
ernment, or act as a repository for its funds.4' Fifth, the United States may
refuse to allow the entity to contract with it for goods and services.42 Fi-
nally, the President can "restrict imports" to a sanctioned party under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
43
The sanctions may be waived by the President should the United
States have an overriding national security, informational, humanitarian, or
"production" interest in the goods, services, or technology it needs from
the party in violation of the Act.44
II. The International Response 45
A. The European Union's Reaction
1. Events Leading Up to the April 1997,Agreement
European Union states reacted angrily to President Clinton's signing
of the Act, but as of yet have responded only with a "clawback" regulation.
Even before the bill was signed, the EU announced its opposition to the
Act's extraterritorial provisions.4 In making its formal complaint to the
United States at the Act's passage, the EU declared that it would legally
challenge any sanctions issued in its name.4 7 The ffteen-nation group's
planned retaliatory counter-sanctions, however, were blocked by Den-
mark's opposition, which argued that such sanctions would be unconstitu-




43. Idt The International Emergency Economic Powers Act gives the President
broad discretion in confronting "threats" to "national security." 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
44. The Act, § 5(f).
45. This Note reflects events before January 1, 1998.
46. AP-Dow Jones News Service, EU Criticizes US. Action on Libya, Iran Arms
Deals, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJE 10745930.
47. Agence France-Presse, Aug. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3903586.
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tional under its laws.48 France vowed to draft its own legislation to protect
its corporations from U.S. sanctions,49 and Germany also strongly criti-
cized the new law.50 At its December 1996 summit, the EU stated that it
supported U.S. values but opposed the use of "unilateral action at the ex-
pense of close partners with shared values." 5'
The EU's first formal response was a "blocking regulation" aimed
mainly at the Helms-Burton legislation but including the Act in its scope.
5 2
That enactment, binding on the fifteen EU states, has four components. It
establishes an obligation not to comply with the Act, neutralizes the Act's
effect, "allows companies to claim foreign compulsion if sued in U.S.
courts," and has a "clawback" provision providing for recovery of damages
and legal costs in European courts. 3
The European Union's second response was to call for a World Trade
Organization panel to rule on the legality of the Act in February 1997.54 In
April 1997, however, the EU suspended its WTO action because the
United States agreed to implement the Act "in a deliberate and fair man-
ner" by working to grant EU companies waivers. The EU also stated that
it would resume its WTO panel claim should such waivers be denied or
withdrawn. 6
The EU states have reason to fear U.S. trade sanctions under the Act.
Twenty percent of its oil is imported from Iran and .Libya, with Italy im-
48. John Palmer, Danes to Block EU Action, THE GUAInIAN (UK), Oct. 23, 1996, at
11, available in 1996 WL 13383010.
49. France Drafts Legislation to Defy New U.S. Sanctions, WALL ST. J. EuR., Aug.
29, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJE 107749744.
50. Roger Boyes & Michael Theodoulou, Bonn Heads Allied Resistance to US 'Ter-
rorism'Sanctions, THE Tvms (LoNDON), Aug. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6511468.
51. EU Summit: Main Points of Foreign and Trade Issues, AFX NEWS, Dec. 16,
1996, available in WL Database EURONEWS.
52. European Union: Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the
Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted By a. Third Country,
Nov. 22, 1996, 36 ILM 125 (1997); Bernd Langeheime, The Legality of Helms-Burton
Under the GATT and Public International Law, Address at the Hastings International &
Comparative Law Review Symposium "The Helms-Burton Act: Domestic Initiatives &
Foreign Responses" (Jan. 25, 1997). Mr. Langeheime is Trade Counselor for the Euro-
pean Union's Delegation of the European Commission to the United States.
53. Id.
54. Tom Buerkle, A Stay in EU-U.S. Trade Spat, INT'L HERALD TRiB, Feb. 13, 1997,
at 12.
55. European Union-United States, Memorandum Concerning the U.S. Helms-
Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 11, 1997. 36 I.L.M. 529
(1997) [hereinafter "EU Understanding"].
56. Id.
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porting almost half its oil from those statesY In fact the Italian state-run
oil company Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi signed a three billion dollar oil in-
vestment deal with Libya in June 1996, while making no public an-
nouncement of the deal because the Act was passing through the U.S.
Congress at that time.58 British exports to Iran increased by fifteen percent
in 1995, to £332 million.59 Spanish, Austrian, German, and other Euro-
pean companies have significant interests in Iran and Libya;60 although the
statute refers only to new investments, any future investments could result
in sanctions.
2. The Total Contract and the Possibility of Sanctions
Despite the April 1997 agreement and its six-month cooling off pe-
riod, a multistate deal to develop Iranian oil fields touched off the first
threat of sanctions under the Act. In September 1997, Total SA, the
French company which took over Conoco's Iranian deal and likely insti-
gated the Act's passage, announced that it would proceed with the proj-
ect.61 Total's partners in the deal are the Russian company Gazprom and
the Malaysian company Petronas.
62
Under the contract, the three corporations will develop the South Pars
oil field in the Persian Gulf south of Iran.63 The deal is the largest between
Iran and a European country since the 1979 revolution.6
The United States immediately called for sanctions under the Act.65
The French government, however, defended the deal under its policy of
open dialogue with Iran, and criticized the Act's extraterritorial provi-
sions.66 Further, another French petroleum company, Elf Aquitaine SA,
57. EU Oil Fears Over US Sanctions Law, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at 4, available
in 1996 WL 10605967.
58. Bhushan Bahree & Brian Coleman, ENI Signed Deal with Libya In June on Gas
Resources, WALL ST. J. EuR., Nov. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJE 10753697. See
also Robert Graham, Italy Keen on Wfarmer Ties With Outcast Regimes, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
9, 1997 available in 1997 WL 3765292.
59. Mark Atkinson, UK Business Risks US Ire by Getting Cosy lVith Tehran, THE
OBSERVER (UK), Nov. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12397847.
60. EU Oil Fears Over US Sanctions Law, supra note 57.
61. Gerard Baker, Guy de Jonquie'res, and David Owen, US Condemns Total's S2bn
Iran Deal, FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1997, at 1.
62. Id
63. Paul Webster, US Threatens Trade War Over Oil Deal, THE GUARDLIAN (UK),
Sept. 30, 1997, at 13.
64. Id
65. Id
66. Roger Cohen, France Scoffs at U.S. Protest Over Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19981
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announced in October 1997 that it would also seek oil contracts with
Iran.67 After a week of heated rhetoric, the State Department announced
that it would delay imposing sanctions while the United States sought a
further agreement with the European Union to avert a trade war over the
Total contract. 68 U.S. and French officials met to discuss the issue, and
although neither Total nor the.United States backed down, no sanctions
were imposed.69
3. Further Negotiations with the European Union
The controversy over the Total contract erupted just weeks before the
April 1997 EU Agreement's six month cooling off period was to expire.
The two sides agreed to conduct a series of meetings in October 199770- and
to continue negotiations rather than go before the WTO.71 Although the
30, 1997, at Al.
67. ElfAquitaine Exploring Iran and Iraq Deals, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 2, 1997, at
9.
68. Laurie Lande, US.: No Decision Yet on Punishing Total for Iran Deal, Dow
JONES NEWS SERv., Oct. 5, 1997.
69. Craig IL Whitney, Cohen Declares Iran Deal Won't Hurt Ties to France, N.Y.
TIES, Oct. 7, 1997, atA6.
70. Julie Wolf, EU, US Will Continue Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1997, at
A19.
71. Agence France-Presse, Europe, US Extend Talks on Laws Against Iran, Cuba,
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two parties failed to reach a second legal agreement, the EU and the United
States signaled "good faith" toward one another over the Act and the
Helms-Burton legislation. 2
B. Russia
Russia also ignored the Act's threatened sanctions. Along with
Petronas and Total, the Russian corporation Gazprom joined in the oil de-
velopment deal with Iran.73 President Yeltsin responded to the threat of
U.S. sanctions under the Act by asserting, "Russia, France, and Iran are all
independent freedom-loving states and it is impermissible for others to in-
terfere and dictate which documents we can sign .... ')74
Making matters more difficult for the United States, Gazprom entered
the deal soon before it was to make a one-billion-dollar bond offering in
world markets. 5 Gazprom is one of Russia's largest corporations, and the
offering was therefore important to the U.S. effort to stabilize the Russian
economy.76  Nonetheless, Senator D'Amato called for a congressional
hearing on the bond offering,77 and requested that the U.S. Export-Import
Bank decline to provide export credits to the company.78 Under the threat
of sanctions, Gazprom suspended its bond offering on November 11,
1997.79 A month later, however, the company simply canceled its agree-
andLibya, Oct. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13414263.
72. Barry James, EU and U.S. Step Back in Clash on Sanctions, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 16, 1997, at 1.
73. John Thornhill, David Owen, and Guy de Jonqui'res, Yeltsin Hits at US Threat
on Iran, FIN. TMES, Oct. 2, 1997, at 5.
74. Id.
75. David E. Sanger, U.S. Sanctions May Backfire on Russian-Iranian Oil Deal,
N.Y. Tam, Oct. 16, 1997, at Al.
76. Id
77. At the October 30, 1997 hearing, a number of officials and senators criticized
Gazprom's actions and discussed the possibility of sanctions. William Ramsey, a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State, gave a summary of the investigations into the dealings of
several foreign corporations. See generally Iran Libya Sanctions Act, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
105th Cong. (1997).
78. Robert S. Greenberger and Laurie Lande, Russia's Gazprom Appears Vulnerable
to U.S. Pressure over Iranian Oil Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1997, at A4; Laurie Lande,
Ex-Im Bank is Expected to Yank Funds For Oil-Service Firms Tied to Gazprom, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 28, 1997, at Al0.
79. Steven Erlanger, Russian Partner in Iran Deal Postpones Its Bond Offering,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at A10.
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ment with the Export-Import Bank ° and appears to be going ahead with its
plan for the Iranian development.
C. Malaysia
The Malaysian national oil company Petronas signed a major invest-
ment deal for Iranian oil development in October 1996, saying that "[w]e
will not submit to U.S. dictation," and that "[t]he U.S. has no right to im-
pose extra-territorial jurisdiction on other countries."81 As a partner with
Total and Gazprom, Petronas raised the ire of the United States when the
three corporations announced that the deal would proceed.
In October 1997, the United States announced that it was sending le-
gal investigators to France, Russia, and Malaysia to look into the con-
tract.8 2 The Malaysian government, however, told the United States that it
would not be permitted to investigate Petronas for violation of the Act. 3 A
group of Malaysian government officials fired off a defiant letter to the
U.S. Congress over the threat of sanctions,84 and the prime minister an-
nounced that the project would go forward.8 5 As with France, U.S. offi-
cials met with Malaysian leaders, 6 and no sanctions were immediately im-
posed.
D. Other American Trading Partners
A number of other states have continued to invest in either Iran or
Libya since the Act's passage. The Ukraine agreed to make several weap-
ons sales to Libya,8 7 and in November 1996 Libya agreed to a deal with
80. Michael R. Gordon, Defying Pressure Over Iran Deal, Russians Spurn U.S. Loan
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at A5.
81. James Kynge, Malaysia Angered by US Sanctions Threat, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 1,
1996, available in 1996 WL 13945441.
82. US. Experts Dispatched, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at A6.
83. Wendy Lim, Gov't Won't Allow US. Probe, BUS. TIas (MALAYSIA), Nov. 13,
1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 13787936. See also Agence France-Presse, Malaysian
Activists, Lawyers Back Refusal to Yield to US Probe, Nov. 14, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13433926.
84. Ramlan Said, Sarban Singh, and Meilani Radzi, State Leaders Denounce US
Congressmen's Move, NEW STRAITS TIMES (MALAYSIA), Nov. 14, 1997, at 1, available in
1997 WL 15074441.
85. Ahmad A. Talib, KL, Paris to Go Ahead With Project, Bus. TIMES (MALAYSIA),
Nov. 18, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 13788118.
86. US Envoy Arrives in Malaysia for Petronas Talks, ASIA PULSE, Nov. 19, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13572172.
87. Boris Vinogradov, Ukraine Skids to "SCUDS", RusSIAN PRESS DIGEST, Dec. 11,
1996, available in 1996 WL 14082401.
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neighboring Tunisia to build a pipeline for oil exports.88 Turkey's then-
Islamic-oriented government signed a twenty-three billion dollar natural
gas export deal with Iran in August 1996,89 and two months later agreed to
triple trade with Libya.90 Turkey denied that its Iranian deal violated the
Act, saying that it constituted a "trade agreement" rather than an invest-
ment.91
In November 1997, Total SA and corporations from Spain, Norway,
and Austria signed a deal with Libya to commence oil exploration in the
Murzuk Basin.92 In the wake of the Total deal with Iran, moreover, the
U.S. government also began an investigation into whether a 180-million-
dollar oil development deal between Iran and companies from Canada and
Indonesia violates the Act.93 As with several other states, the United States
sent investigators to Canada to look into the deal.94
E. Iran and Libya
Libya and Iran reacted to the Act with considerable rhetoric, no doubt
emboldened by the number of nations ignoring the threat of sanctions. Iran
filed a new case with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague, claim-
ing that the Act violates U.S. statements in the Algiers Accords that it will
not intervene in Iranian affairs, even indirectly.95 Libya led a United Na-
tions resolution in the General Assembly calling for the end of unilateral
sanctions which passed, fifty-six to four, but seventy-six states, including
those of the EU, abstained.9 Iran has used recent trade successes to claim
that the Act has had no effect; for example, it announced in February 1997
88. Agence France-Presse, Libya Strikes Gas Export Deal with Tunisia, Dec. 2,
1996, available in 1996 WL 12192096.
89. Thomas Lippman, U.S. Decries Turkey's Gas Deal With Tehran, WASH. PosT,
Aug. 13, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 10725993.
90. U.S. Criticizes Turkish Leader for Libya Trip and Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 1996, at A6.
91. Tehran Sets Iran Gas Deal, Says It Doesn't Defy Ban, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 12,
1996, at A7, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 3114084.
92 Repsol Signs Up Libya, OIL DALY, Nov. 4, 1997, at 7, available in 1997 WL
8667628.
93. Steven Erlanger, Crumbling Walls: U.S. Effort to Isolate Both Iran and Iraq Is
Fraying Badly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A6.
94. Reuters, U.S. Presses Bow Valley Sanctions Threat in Ottowa, FIN. POST
(CANADA), Nov. 8, 1997, at 7, available in 1997 WL 14959655.
95. Iran Files New Case With Iran-US. Claims Tribunal, MEALEY'S INT'IL ARB.
REP., Aug., 1996, at 23, available in WL at I 1 No. 8 MINTARBR 23.
96. Agence France-Presse, General Assembly Calls for End to Unilateral Sanctions,
Nov. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12189940.
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that European and Japanese banks were continuing to grant billions in loan
guarantees despite the threat of sanctions.97 After planning an increased
national budget for 1997, Iran claimed that the American laws against do-
mestic and foreign investment had "failed"98 and, pointing out that U.S.
businesses had been hurt, scoffed, "Conoco out, Total in."
99
Given the number of foreign corporations openly defying the Act, one
may wonder if the United States has been successful in past efforts at ex-
traterritorial application of foreign-policy-based trade controls. Section IV
outlines several such past attempts. Section V discusses the legal grounds
for and objections to extraterritorial application of American law.
I. The Outer Bounds of American Extraterritoriality-
Fruehauf, the Soviet Pipeline, and Helms-Burton
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act represents but the latest in a long
line of efforts by the United States at extraterritorial legislation for foreign
policy objectives. Since the end of World War Two, Congress or the
President has attempted to restrict the trade or investment of foreign sub-
sidiaries of American corporations or foreign corporations dealing in ex-
propriated American property in relation to actions by communist regimes,
white minority rule in Africa, and other policy issues. Few, however, have
been successful and most have been quickly withdrawn. Moreover, none
was as direct as the Act in attempting to restrict trade by wholly foreign
businesses not affecting American property interests.
A. The Freuhauf Case
The earliest major attempt by the United States to enforce extraterri-
torial trade restrictions against companies on foreign soil was the so-called
Fruehauf case, which stemmed from hostilities with China during the Ko-
rean War.1°° During the war, the United States issued regulations prohib-
iting American trade with China or North Korea under the Trading With
97. Alan Friedman, Europe and Japan are Guaranteeing $5 Billion in Loans to Te-
hran, INT'L HERALD TRm., Feb. 3, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 4489484.
98. Agence France-Presse, Iran's New Budget Not Affected by US Sanctions: Raf-
sanjani, Nov. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12187595.
99. Iran Official Says U.S. Business Hurt Most by Sanctions, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Nov. 19, 1996, available in WL Database EURONEWS.
100. Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction over Foreign Subsidiaries:
Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 327 (1983).
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the Enemy Act.101 The prohibitions continued after the war, while U.S. al-
lies Canada and France continued to trade with China.' 2 Complaints by
the Canadian government followed an American attempt to prevent the
Ford Motor Company's subsidiary in Canada from trading with China, and
the United States apparently backed down.
0 3
Conflicts over another U.S. overseas subsidiary's trade with China in
automotive equipment however, led to a legal dispute between the United
States and France. 4 The Fruehauf corporation was incorporated in
France, but an American company owned a majority of its stock and con-
stituted a majority on its corporate board.105 On that basis, the Treasury
Department sought to force the company to break off its business dealings
with China.' °6 The three French citizens on Fruehauf's corporate board
then asked a French court to take over the business and continue its Chi-
nese sales contract' 0 7 The court agreed, 08 and in 1965 the French appeals
court upheld the decision, citing the needs of the company's employees
over the "personal interests" of the American directors.! The United
States made no further effort to enforce its law, and Fruehaufremains one
of the few cases of American foreign-policy-based extraterritorial en-
forcement to come before a court.
B. The 1970s: Rhodesia, The Arab Boycott, and Iran
On three occasions in the 1970s, the United States applied extraterri-
torial sanctions in a limited context. For example, as part of the multina-
tional effort against white minority rule in Rhodesia in the 1960s, the
United States imposed trade sanctions that included foreign subsidiaries of
101. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 10; Fed. Reg. 2503-04
(1942) defined its reach to businesses controlled by those under U.S. jurisdiction.
102. Thompson, supra note 100, at 327.
103. Id
104. William Laurence Craig, Application of the Trading With the Enemy Act to For-
eign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 579, 580 (1970).
105. Id.
106. Id
107. Thompson, supra note 100, at 327-28.
108. Id at 328.
109. As translated in Craig, supra note 104, at 580-81. See Fruehauf Corp. v. Mas-
sardy, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P. 1114274 bis [1965] Gaz. Pal. 86. For a full
translation of the appeal, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CoNTRoLs FOR PoLITcAL
ENDs 83 (1977).
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American businesses located in that country." 0 In 1977, Congress acted to
prevent American firms and their foreign subsidiaries from complying with
the Arab states' boycott of Israel,"' and in 1979 ordered a freezing of all
Iranian assets during the hostage crisis, including again those held by for-
eign subsidiaries of U.S. firms.1
2
C. The Soviet Pipeline
The second major effort by the United States at extraterritorial en-
forcement of trade laws for foreign policy objectives came in the early
years of the Reagan administration. In response to the 1982 Soviet crack-
down on the Polish labor union Solidarity, President Reagan acted to pre-
vent oil and gas related exports to the U.S.S.R. under the Export Admini-
stration Act of 1979 to prevent the construction of an oil pipeline.' 3 That
statute allowed the President to restrict trade by any person subject to U.S.
jurisdiction' 1 4 As in the Fruehauf case, the United States sought to pre-
vent foreign subsidiaries of American companies from engaging in such
trade and went further by attempting to restrict wholly foreign corporations
from exporting goods manufactured with U.S. technologies under license
from American businesses."l 5
Numerous European countries with Soviet sales contracts (as well as
the European Community) protested against the trade restrictions, claiming
that the extraterritorial application was a violation of their sovereignty and
therefore of international law. 116 Both the British and French governments
ordered their firms to continue business with the Soviets. 117 The Reagan
administration initially responded by placing European countries whose
businesses were still trading with the U.S.S.R. and fell under the Export
110. Thompson, supra note 100, at 334; LOWENFELD, supra note 109, at 296-97. In
1972, however, the United States obviated its participation in the global effort through
the Byrd Amendment, which permitted trade in certain materials. Id. at 298-99.
111. Thompson, supra note 100, at 341-42.
112. Id. at 347-48.
113. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Un-
der International andAmerican Law, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1308 (1983).
114. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2406. The statute al-
lows the President to impose export restrictions on a number of commodities.
115. Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving in the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 17 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1194 (1987).
116. Donald Dekieffer, remarks at the American Society of International Law Pro-
ceedings, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls-The Siberian Pipeline,
(April 15, 1983), in 77 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 241,244 (1983).
117. Id.
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Administration Act on a temporary trade blacklist." 8 Two French firms
were forbidden from doing any business in the United States,1 9 and one,
Dresser, sued in U.S. court for an injunction against the sahctions. 120 The
District Court for the District of Columbia denied an injunction, holding
that such relief would harm U.S. foreign policy goals: "... the United
States has a grave interest in its ability to enforce these regulations which
are, in its view, essential to the accomplishment of important foreign pol-
icy objectives." 121 The controversy subsided, however, as Reagan soon
ended his efforts at extraterritorial enforcement under domestic and inter-
national pressure.
1 2
D. The Helms Burton Legislation
The United States refrained from using extraterritorial legislation to
enforce foreign policy for over a decade. In 1996, however, President
Clinton signed the Helms-Burton legislation, which provided for sanctions
against foreign firms "trafficking" in property expropriated by the Cuban
government from American firms or Cuban-Americans. The statute cre-
ated friction between the United States and its trading partners not seen
since the Soviet pipeline case.123 Passed just months before the Act, the
ongoing Helms-Burton controversy has overshadowed the latter statute
since its passage, perhaps because Cuba is not an international pariah like
Libya or Iran.
Like the Act, Helms-Burton seeks to deter certain investments in
Cuba by wholly foreign corporations; 124 it proscribes dealings in property
expropriated by the Cuban revolutionaries from Americans and then-
Cuban nationals.'2 Like the Act, Helms-Burton has engendered angry op-
position from American trading partners in Europe and elsewhere, leading
to the "clawback" regulation described above 126-as well as the complaint
118. Id
119. Note, 81 Mica. L. REV, at 1310 n.17.
120. Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decision-Export Administration Act-Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Incorporated Subsidiaries of U.S. Parent Companies Upheld
in United States Court, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 626 (1983).
121. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108, 110 (1982).
122. Carter, supra note 115, at 1195.
123. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. Law
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (March 12, 1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021-91).
124. Ia at Title Im, § 302.
125. Id.; see also § 4 (definition of "confiscated" property).
126. See Langeheime address, supra note 52.
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before the World Trade Organization, -W Moreover, the statute has yet to
be acted upon;128 like the Act, it may have been more election-year pos-
turing than actual trade strategy.
129
E. How the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act Differs
Whether past efforts at extraterritorial legislation were limited to
trade with particular states or affected trade in several countries, the Act
stands apart in sanctioning the behavior of wholly foreign corporations
with no ties to American business or property. Even the Helms-Burton
legislation involves American po pety expropriated after the Cuban
Revolution. Given the lack of success, hy the United States in its three pre-
vious extraterritorial efforts, the, Aqct's, viability seems unlikely under an
examination of standards of both geal customary international law and
the General Agreement on Tariffs, a... TfAde.
IV. The Act's Viability Und .r General Customary
International Law
Extraterritorial legislation, or the attempt by a government to subject
those beyond its borders to the jurisdiction of its laws, is a highly contro-
versial area of international jurispjcdence. To what extent may a state
seek to enforce its foreign policy, objec9tives on those in other states? What
is the role of state sovereignty in e xtraterritorial questions, especially
where the subject of enforcement is not a national of the state laiming ju-
risdiction? Under what circumstan.ces do most states allow others extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction? Despite some guidelines from the Restatement and a
history of attempts at extraterqi49prij1 legislation, these quostions remain
largely unanswered for the Act's claimed goal of sanctioning the trading
behavior of wholly foreign corporations.
127. World Trade Organization, Permanent Delegation of the European Commission,
United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act-Request for the Es-
tablishment of Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS38/2 (Oct. 8, 1996).
128. See Myers, supra note 9.
129. Because there are many articles on Helms-Burton, I will not dwell on the issue at
length; for further information see, e.g., Symposium, The Helnt.Burton Act: Domestic
Initiatives & Foreign Responses, 20 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP, L. REV. 713 (1997);
Jonathan R. Ratchik, Note and Comment, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 343 (1996); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Con-
gress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419 (1996); Brice M. Clagett,
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent With International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 434 (1996).
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In order to apply extraterritorial legislation such as the Act, a state
must have "jurisdiction to prescribe," that is, the ability "to make its law
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests
of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by
administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court."'130 Under
the Restatement, such jurisdiction exists for conduct or persons within its
territory, activity by its nationals outside the state, and "conduct outside its
territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect within its ter-
ritory.' 3 1 Because the Act seeks to proscribe conduct by foreigtn nationals
outside the United States,'132 its legitimacy depends on the extent of the
latter possibility, known as the "effects doctrine."' 33  Accordingly, that
doctrine's development and limits must be examined.
In the early years of the twentieth century, American courts hesitated
to extend the reach of domestic statutes abroad, even where both parties
were United States citizens. Calling the idea that the Sherman Act applied
to American corporations operating in foreign states a "startling proposi-
tion," Justice Holmes wrote in American Banana Co v. United Fruit Co.,
".. . the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done."'
134
The "general presumption against the extraterritorial application of
statutes" set forth by Holmes still exists today.135 That presumption, how-
ever, may not apply in three cases. First, it does not apply where Congress
has stated an intention that the statute have extraterritorial reach, as with
the Act.136 Second, it is inapplicable where the "failure to extend the scope
of the statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse effects within the
United States. 37 Finally, there is no such presumption where the conduct
130. THERESTATEmENT, § 401(1).
131. Id., § 403.
132. The Act, § 5.
133. The term is from Kenneth R. Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanc-
tions: The Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U. L. REV.
323, 326 (1981).
134. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909).
135. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
136. See id.; Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)
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causes extraterritorial effects but "occurs largely within the United
States."138
For the exception under legislative intent, the issue is "whether lan-
guage in the [relevant Act] gives any indication of a congressional purpose
to extend its coverage beyond places over which the United States as sov-
ereignty or has some measure of legislative control.', 139 Here, Congress
clearly intends the Act to have extraterritorial effect, as both the statute
and the legislative history show a desire to sanction foreign firms investing
in Iran and Libya.140 Although it never mentioned principles of interna-
tional law in committee reports on the bill, Congress implied that foreign
investment in those states has an effect on the security of the United States
by allowing Iranian and Libyan sponsorship of terrorism and -weapons de-
velopment to continue.1 41 Thus, the question whether the United States has
jurisdiction to such prescribe foreign investment rests on the extent and
limits of the "effects doctrine."
The "effects doctrine" was promulgated soon after the American Ba-
nana case. Under that theory, as Justice Holmes defined it in 1911, "[a]cts
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detri-
mental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm
as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting
him within its power."'142
Learned Hand further refined the effects doctrine in 1945, writing:
"[w]e should not impute to Congress an intenf to punish all whom its
courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences in the United
States. [citations omitted] On the other hand, it is settled law.., that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its alle-
giance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states
will ordinarily recognize.' 4
3
In both these cases, the question was whether American businesses
acting abroad caused such "effects" in the United States that they might be
138. Id.
139. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)).
140. The Act, § 5; See generally H. Rm'. No. 104-523, Parts I and 2; S. REP. No.
104-187.
141. S. REP. No. 104-187, at 5.
142. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
143. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd Cir. 1945).
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liable under its laws.1"4 Extraterritorial jurisprudence based on the "effects
doctrine" in such circumstances can be controversial under international
law when the acts were legal in the state in which they were carried out.
14S
The Restatement calls for a two part test for the applicability of law under
the "effects doctrine:" first, whether the effects were "substantial," and
second, whether jurisdiction is "reasonable."'146
Whether foreign activities have "substantial" effect within the United
States to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction has often been litigated; the
enunciated standards, however, do not support the Act's validity under the
"effects doctrine." Under the most developed "effects" standard, that of
Sherman Act cases, an "intent to affect American commerce 1 47 is required
for effects substantial enough to justify extraterritoriality. 14 Although
American courts have not decided the issue of extraterritorial trade sanc-
tions under the "effects doctrine," the Act would likely fail if the antitrust
standard were applied. Foreign corporations trading with Iran or Libya
intend no negative effect on domestic commerce; rather, they probably
want continued trade with the United States as well.
Whatever the result of the "effects" test, the standard of reasonable-
ness spelled out in section 403 of the Restatement14 9 for all practical pur-
poses bars any viable interpretation of the Act under international law. Its
definition of reasonable jurisdiction to prescribe weighs eight "relevant
factors," including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating
state, or (ii) has a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
the regulating state;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activ-
ity, between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible
for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom
the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
144. See Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285; Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 421-23.
145. THERESTATEMENT, § 402 cmt.d.
146. Ia
147. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 924 (1984).
148. See id.; Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am, 549 F.2d 597, 615 (1976); Zenith
Radio v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1189 (1980).
149. THE RESTATEMENT, § 403(1).
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late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international po-
litical, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system.
150
Again, no American court has applied these factors to a trade sanc-
tions measure. The antitrust cases have applied similar factors,"' and un-
der this test the Act cannot be "reasonable." The Act proscribes conduct
outside the United States 152 by foreign actors with little or no domestic ef-
fect. Although the Act's harsh stance against corporations investing in
states which sponsor terrorism is certainly important to Congress, 53 the
storm of opposition it has aroused among American trading partners 154 re-
veals, its lack of general acceptance and nonconformity with traditional in-
ternational law.
In addition, the Act cannot be justified under a principle of universal
jurisdiction. Under that doctrine, states may act against terrorism, piracy,
and other "universal offenses."'155 Clearly, foreign businesses investing in
Libyan or Iranian industries are not themselves engaging in the interna-
tionally recognized felonies for which the Restatement recognizes extrater-
ritorial universal jurisdiction.'56
V. The Act's Viability Under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
From its inception in 1947 to the Uruguay Round Agreements in
1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has represented an at-
tempt to liberalize world trade.157 Under its basic Most Favored Nation
trading status, states are to avoid erecting import barriers. 5 ' Thus, the
United States has an obligation to its trading partners under GATT to pro-
150. Id., § 403(2).
151. See Zenith, 494 F. Supp. at 1187-88; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
152. The Act, § 5(c).
153. See generally H. REP. No. 104-523, Parts 1 and 2; S. REP. No. 104-187.
154. See supra Section III.
155. THE RESTATEMNT, § 404.
156. Id., § 404 cmt.a.
157. JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMic RELATIONS 289-90 (3rd. ed. 1995).
158. GATT, art. I.
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mote free trade. Accordingly, the Act may violate GATT unless it can be
justified under that the agreement's exception for trade barriers related to
national security.
The Most Favored Nation status under GATT calls for states to
equalize customs duties and other import or export charges imposed on the
goods of all states to which it has granted that designation.'59 It states that
"any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originat-
ing in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."'
16
Currently, the United States affords Most Favored Nation status to all but a
handful of nations.' 6 '
A second GATT limitation on trade barriers is contained in Article XI
of that document. It provides:
[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export li-
censes or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any con-
tracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
162
Although some exceptions exist for control of shortages, the thrust of
the Article is to limit restrictions on imports among the contracting parties
to the agreement. 
163
Against these broad principles, GATT provides only narrow excep-
tions for restricting trade. The most prominent such provision, and that
which the Act must rely for its viability, outlines a number of "national se-
curity exceptions. 164 Article XXI allows a party to GATT to take "any ac-
tion which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests; '1 65 that language is limited to situations that involve nuclear ma-
terials, weaponry and munitions, and acts "taken in time of war or other
159. Iat
160. Id
161. JACKSON, ET AL., supra note 157, at 460. Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cambodia,
Cuba, Laos, Montenegro, North Korea, Serbia, Uzbekistan and Vietnam are denied this
status.
162. GATT, arL XI§ 1.
163. Id; JACKSON, ET AL., supra note 157, at 460.
164. GAIT, art. XXI.
165. Id
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emergency in international relations."'166 The Article further allows states
to act under their United Nations Charter obligations.
167
The meaning of "national security" and what authority defines it is
unclear under Article XXI. If the European Union were to allege that the
Act violates Article XI or the Most Favored Nation obligations, 168 the
scope of Article XXI would have to be decided by a WTO panel. The EU
might be hampered in such a claim by its acquiescence to the American
claim under Article XXI in the Nicaraguan trade case from the 1980s.169 In
1985, the Reagan administration cut off all trade with Nicaragua, claiming
that the Sandinista state was a national security threat to the United
States. 170 When Nicaragua brought a case before the GATT Council, Can-
ada and many European countries supported the idea that the United States
could define its own national security interest under that Article. 17 1 The
European Community ambassador at the time also agreed with the Ameri-
can position.
172
Accordingly, if the United States can define its own national security
under Article XXI, the Act could be viable under GATT. 'I'le sponsorship
of terrorist groups and weapons development by Iran and Libya do indeed
pose a serious security threat to American interests. The Act, however,
differs from the Nicaraguan case in a fundamental manner: it seeks to
place trade restrictions not on Iran and Libya, but on foreign firms making
investments in their key industries. 73 Thus, GATT might not permit the
United States to define its national security interest where the definition
involves secondary boycotts.
The EU could still bring a WTO action if sanctions were imposed. 74
Moreover, as described above, Malaysia may also bring a WTO complaint.
Only then will the scope of Article XXI exceptions be decided. Given the
potential application of the Act to businesses incorporated in countries
posing no security threat to the United States, an extension of Article XXI
encompassing the Act would swallow the rule; trade barriers could be
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. The EU complaint against the Helms-Burton legislation, supra note 87, claims
that that statute violates Article XI, among others.




173. The Act, §§ 5-6.
174. The EU reserved its right to continue its WTO claim under the April 1997
agreement. See EU Understanding, supra note 55,
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erected for any number of foreign policy concerns. As the United States
has always been the strongest party behind GATT and the primary advo-
cate of liberalized global trade,175 it would be politically unwise to apply
the Act in defiance of previous norms of GATT trading obligations.
Furthermore, the Act may weaken the fledgling authority and legiti-
macy of the WTO 176 itself 1 77 Because the United States would likely ig-
nore an adverse WTO ruling under GATIs national security exception,
the WTO would certainly lose international prestige. 78 Thus, to maintain
the authority of both GATT and the WTO in international legal disputes,
the United States should suspend operation of the Act to ensure the legiti-
macy of the only global means of resolving such conflicts.
VI. Policy Concerns Surrounding the Act's Implementation
In addition to legal concerns, the Act raises a number of political con-
cerns. The Act may only weaken President Clinton's efforts against ter-
rorist proxy states in the eyes of the international community, and it could
lead to unintended consequences for the states formerly under Soviet do-
minion. Accordingly, the Act is probably politically as well as legally un-
sound.
Above all, the Act may serve to unduly strain U.S. relations with the
European Union without any attendant curtailment of European trade with
Iran and Libya. Even before President Clinton signed the Act, German
leaders harshly criticized Congress for its "lack of communica-
tion... [with] the outside world." 1 As described above, the immediate
political fallout from the Act's passage in August 1996 was a vigorous
round of criticism from America's European allies. Sanctions from the
United States would almost surely be met by EU sanctions, a result not in
the interest of U.S. businesses that may have initially supported the legis-
lation. 8° In fact, the United States now faces a campaign by numerous
175. Jeffrey J. Schott, US. Policies Toward the GAT: Past, Present, Prospective, in
GATT AND CONFlICT MANAGEMENT: A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR A STRONGER
REGIME 23, 42 (Reinhard Rode ed., 1990).
176. For a description of the WTO's formation and purposes, see JACKSON, ET AL.,
supra note 157, at 301-04.
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citing the possible harmful results for American business. Reuters, US Sanctions Laws
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domestic corporations against the Act and similar sanctions.181 If a pur-
pose of the Act was to present Iran and Libya with the image of a United
States tough on terrorism with the support of its trading partners, that ob-
jective failed even before the Act's passage.
Another and perhaps unanticipated possible effect of the, Act lies with
the newly independent states formerly under Soviet control. Oil-rich na-
tions like Azerbaijan look toward trade with neighboring Iran as a means to
remain independent of Russia; trade sanctions against such investment
could push them back toward the Russian fold.182 This concern is not ab-
stract; in December 1997, the government of Turkmenistan entered into a
twenty-five year, 190 million dollar deal with Iran for gas export pipelines,
just months after ending its pipeline flow into Russia.183 Kazakstan may
also develop an export pipeline through Iran.184 Applying sanctions under
the Act against such developments would hinder American interests in
promoting democracy in the region.
VII. Conclusion
The viability of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 is highly
unlikely under considerations of general customary international law,
GATT obligations, and political concerns. Its scope, well beyond those of
other American attempts at extraterritorial legislation, defies all prior
norms of trade sanctions. Furthermore, the Act seems to have so far ac-
complished little aside from angering American trade partners.
The use of extraterritorial legislation to enforce American foreign
policy has always been controversial; the Fruehauf and Soviet pipeline
cases demonstrate that it is also likely to fail when confronted with inter-
national opposition. Yet the Act seeks an unprecedented trade sanction
power over wholly foreign corporations. The above cases involved foreign
subsidiaries of American corporations, and even the Helms-Burton statute
involves the use of expropriated American property. Here, there is no such
claim; as Senator D'Amato put it so bluntly, the statute seeks to force a
Condemned, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1996, at 7, available in 1996 WL 13948415; see also
Agence France-Presse, U.S. Corporate Sanctions on Iran, Libya Seen Opposed by U.S.,
EU Executives, Nov. 6, 1997, available in WL Database EURONEWS.
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6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3771619.
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choice in trade partners among foreign corporations with the threat of
sanctions.
This unprecedented extension of extraterritorial authority seems to
have been only barely considered in the congressional reports issued be-
fore its passage. 85 Congressmen Hamilton and Moran's "Concerns on the
Bill" attached to the first House Report alludes to the possibility that other
governments may claim that the Act violates international law2 '8 They
treated this possibility, however, only as a policy concern, that is, that the
United States might have to act alone.'" Neither they nor the House or
Senate Committees appear to have weighed the Act against standards of
international law or GATT obligations.' Given the proximity of the tim-
ing of the Act with the loss of American contracts in Iran, it seems clear
that the statute was passed to address political and economic concerns
without due regard for its legal implications.
As discussed in Sections V and VI, the Act is likely beyond the pur-
view of both general customary international law and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 is
an anomaly under international law. It would extend the use of extraterri-
torial trade sanctions to enforce American foreign policy beyond any pre-
vious point. If applied, it would set the precedent that states may use trade
sanctions to affect the acts of wholly foreign business, which, if imitated,
could disrupt the liberal standards of world trade. Therefore, both political
and legal considerations call for the suspension of the Act before the impo-
sition of trade sanctions against any foreign corporations.
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